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Naor’s observable queueing model describes an M/M/1 queue with
strategic customers and a system manager who maximizes the long-run average
revenue rate or social benefit rate. Customers have identical service values and
waiting time costs, assuming the waiting cost is linear in time. A new customer
chooses to either enter the system or balk after observing the queue length.
The system manager decides on the admission fee, which is assumed to be a
constant. The results of Naor’s model are: the optimal policy for customers
is a threshold policy, and customers enter if and only if the queue length is no
larger than a threshold; the revenue-maximizing threshold is no larger than the
socially optimal threshold, or equivalently, a revenue maximizer (RM) charges
a fee no less than a social optimizer (SO).
This research studies an observable queueing system in which the ar-
rival rate is not known with certainty by either customers or the system man-
vi
ager. The customer population is modeled to be either homogeneous or het-
erogeneous. We present three different models: static pricing with uncertain
arrival rate and heterogeneous customers; state-dependent pricing with un-
certain arrival rate and homogeneous customers; and state-dependent pricing
with uncertain arrival rate and heterogeneous customers. We study the system
stability, the optimal behavior of customers and the optimal pricing policies
of the system manager.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
There are many queueing systems in real life: a line of customers at
a restaurant waiting to be seated; a line in front of a movie theater ticket
window; or queues of visitors waiting for a ride in the theme park. In such
scenarios, any new customer who just arrives may have the following concerns:
How long is the queue? How fast the line is moving? How good is the food
in this restaurant? How much does a ticket cost? Is there any other option
besides waiting in this line? It is interesting to observe that each customer
acts independently in a self-interested manner. Customers could have different
benefit-cost analyses based on their self-interest. They may decide to join the
queue, balk, renege the decision after they join, or revisit the queue multiple
times in order to find a better time to join the queue.
In 1969, Naor [15] was the first to publish his work on a strategic
queueing model that incorporates the importance of pricing in a queueing
system to regulate demand and optimize social benefit or revenues. In almost
every service system, customers independently act in order to maximize their
benefit. Components of a customer’s welfare might include: the service rate
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- the average rate of complete service; service value - the value received from
the service; waiting time - the time until service is completed; and the fee
charged in order to get served. So the optimal behavior of a single customer is
also affected by other customers, servers or the system manager. Hence, game
theory and equilibrium behavior of customers must now be incorporated into
the model. Pricing plays a critical role in such game theoretic considerations,
assuming customers are price and delay sensitive.
In terms of pricing a service, there are some examples of interest. One
example is the pricing strategy in transportation systems. The I-35E TEXpress
Lanes in Texas opened in May 2017. Drivers have the alternatives to take the
main lanes for free or pay to use the TEXpress Lanes. The TEXpress Lanes are
(in theory) managed to keep traffic moving at 50 mph or faster. Traffic speeds
are maintained through dynamic pricing based on road congestion. Lee County
in Florida applies variable pricing on the Cape Coral and Midpoint toll bridges
and offers specific discount hours. Drivers are encouraged to shift from peak
periods to discount periods. New York City has proposed charging vehicles
for driving in the congested southern half of Manhattan. This congestion
pricing encourages passengers to take public transit and the tolls will be used
to support the expected increase in transit ridership.
After Naor’s paper, there have been numerous papers published on the
optimal control of strategic queues. These papers typically study the behavior
of a revenue maximizing firm or a manager interested in maximizing the social
benefit. A major subject of research is on the effect of information on decision
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makers. In this research we are interested in two information levels: the
uncertain knowledge of system parameters and the asymmetric information
when customers are heterogeneous and the system manager cannot distinguish
among customers.
1.2 Naor’s Model and Extensions
In Naor’s seminal queueing model [15], potential customers arrive ac-
cording to a Poisson process and receive i.i.d. exponentially distributed ser-
vices. These customers decide whether or not to enter the queue by observing
the queue length and comparing their expected waiting cost to their fixed value
for receiving service, entering only if the net expected benefit is non-negative.
In this “observable” model customers are allowed to balk, but are not allowed
to renege. In Naor’s paper, and many others, this framework has been explored
with three different control schemes: no manager, a social optimizer (SO) and
a revenue maximizer (RM). The SO strives to maximize social benefit rate,
usually by imposing an admission fee, whereas the RM wishes to maximize
the revenue rate.
In Naor’s model [15] of observable queues with a deterministic arrival
rate and homogeneous customers, the system manager utilizes a static pricing
approach in which the admission fee is fixed. The customers’ optimal policy
is a threshold policy, i.e., they enter the system only if the current system size
is below a fixed value. In our study, and much previous work, it is important
to identify properties of the S(p), the social benefit rate as a function of the
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admission fee p, and Z(p), the revenue rate as a function of p. Naor proved
that the revenue-maximizing fee p∗Z is no less than the social-optimizing fee
p∗S, and thus that the revenue-maximizing threshold n
∗
Z is no greater than the
social-optimizing threshold n∗S.
Some models consider customer heterogeneity. Edelson and Hildebrand
[7] assume that the waiting cost rate has a discrete distribution with two
possible values, c1 and c2. They observe that S(p) is unimodal but that Z(p)
can be bimodal. Furthermore, they show that the usual relation p∗S ≤ p∗Z does
not necessarily hold. Schroeter [20] modifies Naor’s model by assuming that
the waiting cost rate is uniformly distributed over an interval [0, cmax] and
simplifies the derivation of the profit-maximizing price. Larsen [13] gives a
numerical experiment by assuming the service value is a continuous uniform
random variable, and finds that both S(p) and Z(p) are unimodal in p. He also
proves that p∗S ≤ p∗Z in the special case in which customers enter if and only if
the system is empty. Para-Fruos and Aranda-Gallego [17] assume two classes
of customers with different time values and observe that p∗S ≤ p∗Z does not
hold. Hassin [9] considers an M/M/1 unobservable queue where the service
value or the waiting cost rate is a random variable obtaining one of two given
values with known probabilities. For each case, he investigates three subcases:
customers are uninformed of the realization of the random variable and the
server sets a single price independent of the realization; customers are informed
and the the server sets a sing price depending on the realization; customers
are informed, but the server sets a single price before the random variable is
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realized. Related conclusions are that if the service value is uncertain, in terms
of the revenue rate, it is better to not inform customers when customers have
small waiting cost rate, but worse when they have large waiting cost rate; if
the waiting cost rate is uncertain, the social welfare is the same whether to
inform customers or not, given that the price induces positive demand. Sun
and Li [21] extend [9] by allowing random parameter to obtain more than two
values and get similar results.
Some papers investigate state dependent pricing by allowing various
fees as the queue length changes. Lipmann and Stidham [14] study a system
with a state dependent fee to achieve social optimality, considering holding
costs and discounting. Chen and Frank [5] study a system with a state-
dependent pricing structure, in which the admission fee depends on the queue
length. When customers are homogeneous, customers follow a threshold pol-
icy. In this case, the SO and RM have the same optimal pricing policies
and the admission fee is decreasing in the queue length. They also provide
an extension in which customers have two possible service values. Here, the
SO follows the same optimal policy as in the homogeneous case by treating
the two types of customers as indistinguishable. However, the RM follows
a two-threshold policy in an attempt to extract more revenue from the high
service-value customers while possibly sacrificing low-value customers.
The work on arrival rate uncertainty is limited. Besbes and Maglaras
[4] examine an M/M/1 queue with a non-homogeneous Poisson arrival pro-
cess. The underlying dynamics of the arrival process cannot be formulated by
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a precise model. They derive dynamic pricing policies via a stochastic fluid
model approximation. The solution is near-optimal for a market with high
volumes of demand and slow variation of market size. Afe`che and Ata [1]
study an observable queue with two types of customers: patient ones with a
lower waiting cost rate clow and impatient ones with chigh. The proportion q of
patient customers is unknown. They develop a Bayesian learning model using
dynamic pricing in order to maximize the discounted expected revenue. Haviv
and Randhawa [11] consider an M/M/1 unobservable queue with heteroge-
neous service values. They assume the system manager does not know about
the arrival rate and applies demand-independent static pricing by solving a
robust optimization problem. They find that the pricing policy performs well
for some distributions of service value. Chen and Hasenbein [6] consider arrival
rate uncertainty in Naor’s model in both the observable and observable cases.
Finally, some general results in Hassin and Snitkovsky [10] imply that Naor’s
results on thresholds hold for some models with arrival rate uncertainty.
1.3 Markov Decision Process Preliminaries
We follow the notation used by Puterman [18] and describe an MDP
by a five-tuple < T, S,A, P,R >. T is a set of decision epochs or stages t at
which the agent observes the system state and make decisions. S is the state
space and St refers to the state at time t. A is the action set and As,t denotes
the set of allowable actions that can be taken after observing state s at time
t. P represents the transition function, and Pt(s
′ | s, a) defines the transition
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probability from s to s′ by taking action a at time t. R is the reward function,
and rt(s, a, s
′) defines the reward of transition from state s to s′, by taking
action a at time t. A deterministic and Markovian decision rule d maps S to
A and specifies which action to take in state s. A deterministic and Markovian
policy pi = {d1, d2, . . .} is defined by a sequence of decision rules. When the
same decision rule is applied at each decision epoch, we say that the policy is
a stationary policy.
One can evaluate a policy with regard to the discounted reward cri-
terion. Let γ ∈ [0, 1) be a discount factor. The value of a policy, V pi(s),
is defined as the expected total discounted rewards starting at state s and
following policy pi. The discounted reward for an infinite-horizon MDP is
V =
∞∑
i=1
γi−1ri.
Where ri is the reward obtained at step i. The optimal policy, pi
∗, is the policy
that maximizes V pi(s), ∀s ∈ S. The value V pi of policy pi obeys the following
equation:
V pi(s) = R(s, pi(s)) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′ | s, pi(s))V pi(s′).
The Bellman equations characterize the optimal value function for a given
MDP and criterion. It has the following formulation:
V ∗(s) = max
a∈A
[
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′ | s, a)V ∗(s′)
]
.
Existing algorithms for solving an MDP, including value iteration, pol-
icy iteration and linear programming, generally require accurate knowledge of
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transition probabilities. The optimal policy is sensitive to the transition prob-
abilities. In practice, the transition probabilities are not known with certainty
due to estimation errors. The uncertainty is described in terms of a set of
possible transition probabilities. In some work, the problem is formulated in
a Bayesian framework in which prior information on the transition probabili-
ties is available. Some other work considers a game-theoretic formation using
a max-min criterion under various uncertainty descriptions. The transition
probabilities can be described by a set of linear inequalities (MDPIP) [22] or
a convex set [2], or bounded by intervals (BMDP) [8, 19], or constrained by a
“rectangularity property” [12, 16].
For an MDP with finite state and action space, the uncertain transi-
tion matrices can be described more specifically as follows. For each action,
there exist a uncertainty set which includes all possible transition matrices
associated with the action, and each row of a transition matrix describes the
transitions from a single state to other states associated with the action. We
consider a robust, i.e., adversarial model of the uncertain transition matrices.
There are two primary ways to formulate the adversarial model [2, 12, 16]: a
static adversary and a dynamic adversary. In the static model, nature chooses
the same transition probability every time the same state-action pair is en-
countered, while in the dynamic model, nature chooses a possibly different
transition probability at every time point. The static model may be reason-
able as a conservative model of unknown parameters, but solving the problem
is generally hard [2]. The dynamic model is a relaxation of the static model
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and can be solved efficiently by some algorithms.
Proposition 2 in [19] shows that there exists an optimal Markovian,
stationary deterministic policy for the discounted cost dynamic adversarial
model. Lemma 3.3 in [12] states that when the decision maker is restricted to
stationary policies, then the objective values of static and dynamic adversarial
models are the same.
1.4 Organization
In this research, we extend Naor’s observable model in three ways:
(1) by allowing customers to be economically heterogeneous, (2) by assuming
that the arrival rate is not known with certainty, and (3), by considering state
dependent pricing policies. We study three models which consider: (1)(2),
(2)(3), and (1)(2)(3). The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 considers a model with (1) and (2). Chapter 3 considers a model
with (2) and (3). Chapter 4 considers a model with (1), (2) and (3). Chapter
5 summarizes the conclusions, our contributions and future work.
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Chapter 2
Static Pricing with Uncertain Arrival Rate
and Heterogeneous Customers
2.1 Model
The model we study is an M/M/1 system with an unknown arrival rate
Λ and deterministic service rate µ, operating under the first-come-first-serve
service discipline. Λ is a non-negative random variable with cdf FΛ, which is
known to customers and the system manager. We assume that an entering
customer’s waiting cost is a linear function of the total time he spends in the
system. Customers have a non-negative service value X and waiting cost rate
Y with proper joint cdf FXY . Let FX and FY be the marginal cdf’s of X and
Y , respectively. Further, we set E[X] = R, E[Y ] = C, for consistency with the
homogeneous case.
As mentioned above, the system manager does not observe individual
customer values for service or waiting. A fixed admission fee p is imposed by
the system manager. The queue length is observable to customers when they
arrive. Customers are risk neutral and decide whether to enter the system or
not upon arrival, based on their expected net benefit. Reneging is forbidden
and a customers who balks receives zero net benefit.
10
Suppose a new customer arrives when the number of customers in the
system is n−1 (for n ≥ 1). His expected total waiting time is then n
µ
, including
his own service. Let p be the admission fee, x be his service value and y be
his waiting cost rate. Then the new customer enters the system if and only if
his net benefit is non-negative, or x − y n
µ
≥ p. Now we wish to consider the
fraction of customers that enter the system. First, define the random variables
Θn = X − Y n
µ
, n = 1, 2, . . . .
Let FΘn be the cdf of Θn, and let F¯Θn be the complementary cdf. Then the
fraction of entering customers when the queue length is n− 1, is given by
F¯Θn(p) = PX,Y
(
X − Y n
µ
≥ p
)
, n = 1, 2, . . . . (2.1)
By the splitting property of Poisson processes, the corresponding effective
arrival rate in state n− 1 is given by
Λn−1(p) = ΛF¯Θn(p), n = 1, 2, . . . . (2.2)
In the results in the sequel, we implicitly assume that both Λ and (X, Y )
possess density functions. However, it should be clear from the proofs that
the results also apply when these random variables are discrete.
2.2 Stability
In this section we study the stability of the model just introduced. Since
the arrival rate is random, and the customer valuations are heterogeneous, es-
tablishing stability of the system is not completely trivial. In fact, considering
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the random arrival rate, established at time 0, we are really considering a
family of M/M/1 queues. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 1. Let MΛ/M/1 denote an M/M/1 queue with a non-negative
random arrival rate Λ. The system is said to be stable w.p. 1 if the associated
Markov chain is positive recurrent w.p. 1.
Now consider the MΛ/M/1 system introduced in Section 2.1, with het-
erogeneous customers. For all p ≥ 0, with F¯Θn(p) given in (2.1), define the
following random variables:
Φn(p) :=
{
Λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p) n = 1, 2, . . .
1 n = 0.
(2.3)
Theorem 2.2.1. For a given value of p ≥ 0, the MΛ/M/1 with heterogeneous
customers is stable w.p. 1 if and only if the following conditions hold w.p. 1:
∞∑
n=0
Φn(p) <∞
∞∑
n=0
1
Λn(p)Φn(p)
=∞. (2.4)
Proof. For a birth-death process with given birth rates {λ0, λ1, . . .} and death
rates {µ1, µ2, . . .}, set
φn =
{
λ0λ1···λn−1
µ1µ2···µn n = 1, 2, . . .
1 n = 0.
From standard results, the corresponding continuous-time Markov chain is
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positive recurrent iff
∞∑
n=0
φn <∞
∞∑
n=0
1
λnφn
=∞.
In our model, the effective arrival rate when the queue length is i is Λi(p).
Thus, for any p ≥ 0 using (2.2) and (2.3) we have
Φn(p) =
{∏n−1
i=0 Λi(p)
µn
, n = 1, 2, . . .
1, n = 0.
The result then holds by simply extending the classical results to our case.
Note that we employ a capital Φn for our case, since the multipliers are
functions of Λ and hence are themselves random variables.
We now present an important sufficient condition for stability of our
model.
Lemma 2.2.2. For a fixed p ≥ 0, the MΛ/M/1 system with heterogeneous
customers is stable w.p. 1 if
lim
n→∞
Λ
µ
F¯Θn(p) < 1 w.p. 1.
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Proof.
∞∑
n=0
Φn(p) = 1 +
∞∑
n=1
Λn
µn
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p)
= 1 +
∞∑
n=1
n∏
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
∞∑
n=0
1
Λn(p)Φn(p)
=
1
ΛF¯Θ1(p)
+
∞∑
n=1
µn
Λn+1
∏n+1
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
=
1
ΛF¯Θ1(p)
+
∞∑
n=1
1
µ
∏n+1
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
) .
For the first series, note that
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏n+1
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
∏n
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = limn→∞ Λµ F¯Θn+1(p) < 1 w.p. 1.
Then using the ratio test and the assumption of the theorem, we have
∞∑
n=0
Φn(p) <∞ w.p. 1.
For the second series, the ratio test is
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ
∏n
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
µ
∏n+1
i=1
(
Λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = limn→∞
[
Λ
µ
F¯Θn+1(p)
]−1
> 1 w.p. 1.
We have used the fact that the expression in brackets has a limit strictly less
1. Hence, the limit of the inverse is strictly greater than 1. So, w.p. 1
∞∑
n=0
1
Λn(p)Φn(p)
=∞.
Hence, the system is stable almost surely by Theorem 2.2.1.
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Lemma 2.2.3. For an MΛ/M/1 system with heterogeneous customers, ∀p ≥
0,
lim
n→∞
F¯Θn(p) = 0.
Proof. Let fY (y) be the marginal pdf of Y and F¯X|y be complementary con-
ditional cdf of X (given Y = y). Then, using the law of total probability,
F¯Θn(p) = P
(
X ≥ p+ n
µ
Y
)
=
∫ ∞
0
P
(
X ≥ p+ n
µ
Y | Y = y
)
fY (y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
F¯X|y
(
n
µ
y + p
)
fY (y)dy.
Clearly, 0 ≤ F¯X|y
(
n
µ
y + p
)
≤ 1 for all n ≥ 0 and all y ≥ 0. Thus, F¯X|y is
uniformly bounded by 1, which is integrable against fY (y).
Applying dominated convergence, we obtain
lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
0
F¯X|y
(
n
µ
y + p
)
fY (y)dy =
∫ ∞
0
lim
n→∞
F¯X|y
(
n
µ
y + p
)
fY (y)dy = 0,
for all p ≥ 0. We used the fact that the limit inside the integral goes to zero,
since FX,Y is assumed to be a proper cdf.
Thus ∀p ≥ 0,
lim
n→∞
F¯Θn(p) = 0.
We are now prepared to prove our main stability result.
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Theorem 2.2.4. The MΛ/M/1 with heterogeneous customers system is stable
w.p. 1, for all p ≥ 0.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.3, for all p ≥ 0 and for each realization Λ(ω) of the
arrival rate we have that
lim
n→∞
Λ(ω)
µ
F¯Θn(p) =
Λ(ω)
µ
lim
n→∞
F¯Θn(p) = 0.
In other words, ∀p ≥ 0,
lim
n→∞
Λ
µ
F¯Θn(p) = 0 w.p. 1.
Thus, by Lemma 2.2.2 the system is stable w.p. 1.
2.3 Revenue Rate and Social Benefit Rate
In this section we study the behavior of the RM and SO, through their
respective rate functions. In particular, for a fixed price p we analyze the
revenue rate Z(p) and the social benefit rate S(p). These functions are the
key to examining the relationship between the optimal admission fees for the
the two types of optimizers.
With Φn defined in (2.3), for all p ≥ 0, define the random variable
M =
∞∑
n=0
Φn = 1 +
∞∑
n=1
Λn
µn
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p). (2.5)
Recall that M is random via its dependence on Λ.
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Next, for all p ≥ 0, let pin(p) be the “expected” steady state probability
that the number of customers in the system is n. Then
pin(p) = EΛ
(
Φn
M
)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
M(λ)
Φn(λ)fΛ(λ)dλ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (2.6)
In the theorem below, note that we use the term “expected rate.” For each
realization of Λ, there is a revenue rate for any fixed p. When we average over
all realizations of Λ, we then obtain an expected rate.
Theorem 2.3.1. For an MΛ/M/1 with heterogeneous customers, the expected
revenue rate is given by
Z(p) = µp (1− pi0(p)) .
The expected social benefit rate is given by
S(p) = µ
∞∑
i=1
pii(p)E [Θi |Θi ≥ p] .
Proof. By Theorem 2.2.4 the system is stable w.p. 1. For each realization of
λ and each fixed p, the rate at which customers depart the system is µ(1 −
pi0(p, λ)), by standard results. Hence, the revenue rate is µp(1 − pi0(p, λ)).
Taking expected values with respect to Λ yields the first result.
For the expected social benefit rate, first suppose there are i customers
in the system, and a new customer arrives with service value x and waiting
cost rate y. This customer will have an expected benefit of{
x− y i+1
µ
if x− y i+1
µ
≥ p
0 if x− y i+1
µ
< p.
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Of course, in the latter case the customer does not join the queue. Thus,
in state i the expected benefit per customer is E [Θi |Θi ≥ p]. Notice that
this expectation is taken with respect to the cdf of Θi and is independent of
Λ. Then, as argued above, we take the expectation with respect to Λ and
compute the overall benefit rate by standard Markov chain theory to obtain
S = µ
∑∞
i=1 pii(p)E [Θi |Θi ≥ p] .
Finally, we end with a result pertaining to a general property of Z that
will be of use in the next section. The proof of the theorem is given in the
appendix. Note that the property is not immediately obvious, and requires
additional conditions on the joint distribution of X and Y , and on Λ.
Theorem 2.3.2. Suppose E[Θ2n] <∞ for all n ≥ 1 and that
E
[
Λ/µ
1− Λ/µ
]
<∞.
Then limp→∞ Z(p) = 0.
Note that E[Θ2n] is finite for all n if and only if it is true for n = 1.
For example, if X and Y each have a finite variance and jointly have a finite
covariance, then the condition holds for all n. The second condition essentially
says that the expected queue length in the corresponding, standard, M/M/1
queue must be finite. This second condition, although sufficient, may not be
necessary. However, it is needed in our proof to carry out several applications
of dominated convergence.
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2.4 Heterogeneous Service Values
Unfortunately, the expressions for the expected revenue and social ben-
efit rates given in Theorem 2.3.1 are somewhat complicated to analyze in the
general case. Below, we give an example in which the social benefit rate can
be simplified allowing a more nuanced comparison of the SO and RM.
In particular, consider the case where the service value is exponentially
distributed and the waiting cost rate is constant. Suppose then that X ∼
exp( 1
R
) and Y ≡ C.
Theorem 2.4.1. Consider an MΛ/M/1 system with heterogeneous customers.
If the service value X ∼ exp( 1
R
) and the waiting cost rate is C, then the social
benefit rate is given by
S(p) = µ(R + p) (1− pi0(p)) .
Proof. Using the memoryless property we have,
E [Θi |Θi ≥ p] = E
[
X − Ci
µ
∣∣∣∣X ≥ p+ Ciµ
]
= R + p.
Thus
S(p) = µ
∞∑
i=1
pii(p)E [Θi |Θi ≥ p]
= µ(R + p)
∞∑
i=1
pii(p)
= µ(R + p) (1− pi0(p)) .
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With this simplification in hand, we can say more about the relationship
between the optimal fees for the SO and RM.
Theorem 2.4.2. Consider an MΛ/M/1 system with heterogeneous customers,
service value X ∼ exp( 1
R
), and Y ≡ C. Assume
E
[
Λ/µ
1− Λ/µ
]
<∞.
Suppose the social benefit rate S(p) and the revenue rate Z(p) are unimodal
and continuously differentiable on p ∈ [0,∞). Let p∗Z and p∗S be the social-
optimizing and revenue-maximizing fees, respectively. Then
p∗S ≤ p∗Z .
Proof. First, we have
S(p) = µ(R + p) (1− pi0(p))
and
S ′(p) = µ (1− pi0(p))− µ(R + p)pi′0(p).
Similarly,
Z(p) = µp (1− pi0(p)) (2.7)
and
Z ′(p) = µ (1− pi0(p))− µppi′0(p). (2.8)
Since p∗S maximizes S(p),
S ′(p∗S) = µ (1− pi0(p∗S))− µ(R + p∗S)pi′0(p∗S) = 0. (2.9)
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Set g(p) = dZ(p)
dp
. Then combining (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) we have
g(p∗S) = µ(R + p
∗
S)pi
′
0(p
∗
S)− µp∗Spi′0(p∗S) = µRpi′0(p∗S).
We now use a modification of the arguments used to prove Lemma 1.0.1 in
the appendix. Note that for each i, the F¯Θi in this special case is strictly
decreasing, since it is the ccdf of a shifted exponential random variable. Hence,
pi0(p) is a strictly increasing function of p on [0,∞). So,
pi′0(p) > 0 ∀p > 0.
Thus, in particular g(p∗S) > 0 .
Now, suppose p∗S > p
∗
Z , by assumption p
∗
Z is the unique maximum of
Z. However, we have that g(p∗S) > 0 and that there must exist another point
p˜ > p∗S, with g(p˜) < 0. We know this is the case because limp→∞ Z(p) = 0
by Theorem 2.3.2, which implies that the derivative of Z must be negative for
arbitrarily large values of p. These two facts about the derivative of Z imply
the existence of another local minimum, which contradicts our unimodality
assumption. Hence p∗S ≤ p∗Z .
The unimodality assumption is critical here. Numerical evidence indi-
cates that S and Z are indeed unimodal in this case, but establishing these
properties directly is quite difficult, due to the complex expression for pi0.
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2.5 Computational Study
In this section, we give some examples of interest, in which we see the
revenue rate and the social benefit rate are not unimodal functions of the
admission fee.
2.5.1 Two-category Service
In this section, we consider a model in which the service value is a
discrete random variable with two possible values, but the waiting cost rate is
a constant. Suppose
X =
{
Rl w.p. ql
Rh w.p. qh.
Assume 0 ≤ Rl ≤ Rh, and ql + qh = 1. The waiting cost rate Y ≡ C.
First, we compute the joining fraction of the customers. Define
K1 =
⌊
µ(Rl − p)
C + 
⌋
and
K2 =
⌊
µ(Rh − p)
C − 
⌋
.
When K1 ≥ 1,
Rl − C i
µ
≥ p, i = 1, 2, . . . , K1.
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The joining fraction of customers, when the queue length is i− 1, is
F¯Θi(p) = Pr{X − C
i
µ
≥ p}
= Pr{X ≥ C i
µ
+ p}
=

1 1 ≤ i ≤ K1
qh K1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ K2
0 i ≥ K2 + 1.
When K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1,
Rh − C i
µ
≥ p, i = 1, 2, . . . , K2.
Then
F¯Θi(p) =
{
qh 1 ≤ i ≤ K2
0 i ≥ K2 + 1.
When K2 < 1,
Rh − C i
µ
< p, i ≥ 1.
In this case, no customer is willing to enter the system.
Next, we compute the steady-state probabilities. ∀p ≥ 0, if K1 ≥ 1,
Φn =

1 n = 0
Λn
µn
1 ≤ n ≤ K1
Λn
µn
qn−K1h K1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ K2
0 n ≥ K2 + 1.
When K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1,
Φn =

1 n = 0
Λn
µn
qnh 1 ≤ n ≤ K2
0 n ≥ K2 + 1.
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When K2 < 1,
Φn =
{
1 n = 0
0 n ≥ 1.
According to (2.5),
M = 1 +
K2∑
n=1
Φn
=

1 +
∑K1
n=1
Λn
µn
+
∑K2
n=K1+1
Λn
µn
pn−K1h K1 ≥ 1
1 +
∑K2
n=1
Λn
µn
pnh K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1
1 K2 < 1.
Then using (2.6), the steady-state probabilities are
pi0(p) = EΛ
(
1
M
)
pin(p) = EΛ
(
Φn
M
)
.
Next, in order to get the social benefit rate, we also need the expected
benefit of a single customer given he decides to enter the system:
E [Θi |Θi ≥ p] =

Rlql +Rhqh − Cµ i 0 ≤ p < Rl − Cµ i
Rh − Cµ i Rl − Cµ i ≤ p < Rh − Cµ i
0 p ≥ Rh − Cµ i.
Thus, we can compute the revenue rate and the social benefit rate according
to Theorem 2.3.1.
Finally, we give four computational examples. In case 1 and 2, we
assume a discrete arrival rate with same possible values but different proba-
bilities. In case 3 and 4 we assume an exponentially distributed arrival rate
with different expectations. The parameters are shown in Table 2.1.
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Two-category service
Constant cost
λ µ Rl Rh C
Case 1 [0.5,5] w.p. [0.1,0.9] 1 50 150 5
Case 2 [0.5,5] w.p. [0.9,0.1] 1 50 150 5
Case 3 exp( 1
0.95
) 1 50 150 5
Case 4 exp( 1
4.5
) 1 50 150 5
Table 2.1: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate
We investigate the revenue rate and the social benefit rate in these
cases. We present the revenue rate in figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. These four
plots indicate that the revenue rate, as a function of the admission fee p, can
have more than one modes. Similarly, we show the social benefit rate in figures
2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. The social benefit rate can also have multiple modes in
figures 2.5 and 2.7.
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Figure 2.1: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate case 1,
Revenue Rate
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Figure 2.2: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 2,
Revenue Rate
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Figure 2.3: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 3,
Revenue Rate
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Figure 2.4: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 4,
Revenue Rate
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Figure 2.5: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 1,
Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 2.6: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 2,
Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 2.7: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 3,
Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 2.8: Two-category Service Value, Constant Waiting Cost Rate, case 4,
Social Benefit Rate
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2.5.2 Uniform Waiting Cost
In this section, we give a computational example in which customers
have a fixed service value, but different waiting cost rates. Suppose the service
value is constant with X ≡ R and let the waiting cost be uniformly distributed,
with Y ∼ U [C − , C + ], where  ∈ (0, C).
First, we compute the joining fraction of the customers. Define
K1 =
⌊
µ(R− p)
C + 
⌋
and
K2 =
⌊
µ(R− p)
C − 
⌋
.
When K1 ≥ 1,
R− (C + ) i
µ
≥ p, i = 1, 2, . . . , K1.
The joining fraction of customers, when the current queue length is i− 1, is
F¯Θi(p) = Pr{R− Y
i
µ
≥ p}
= P
(
Y ≤ µ(R− p)
i
)
=

1 1 ≤ i ≤ K1
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
K1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ K2
0 i ≥ K2 + 1.
When K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1,
R− (C − ) i
µ
≥ p, i = 1, 2, . . . , K2.
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Then
F¯Θi(p) =
{
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
1 ≤ i ≤ K2
0 i ≥ K2 + 1.
When K2 < 1,
R− (C − ) i
µ
< p, i ≥ 1.
Again, in this case, no customer is willing to enter the system.
Next, we compute the steady-state probabilities. ∀p ≥ 0, if K1 ≥ 1,
Φn =

1 n = 0
Λn
µn
1 ≤ n ≤ K1
Λn
µn
∏n
i=K1+1
[
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
]
K1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ K2
0 n ≥ K2 + 1.
When K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1,
Φn =

1 n = 0
Λn
µn
∏n
i=1
[
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
]
1 ≤ n ≤ K2
0 n ≥ K2 + 1.
When K2 < 1,
Φn =
{
1 n = 0
0 n ≥ 1.
According to (2.5),
M = 1 +
K2∑
n=1
Φn
=

1 +
∑K1
n=1
Λn
µn
+
∑K2
n=K1+1
Λn
µn
∏n
i=K1+1
[
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
]
K1 ≥ 1
1 +
∑K2
n=1
Λn
µn
∏n
i=K1+1
[
µ(R−p)
2i
− C−
2
]
K1 < 1, K2 ≥ 1
1 K2 < 1.
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Then using (2.6), the steady-state probabilities are
pi0(p) = EΛ
(
1
M
)
pin(p) = EΛ
(
Φn
M
)
.
Next, in order to get the social benefit rate, we also need the expected
benefit of a single customer give he decides to enter the system. Some algebra
yields:
E [Θi |Θi ≥ p] =

R− C
µ
i 0 ≤ p < R− C+
µ
i
1
2
(
R + p− C−
µ
i
)
R− C+
µ
i ≤ p < R− C−
µ
i
0 p ≥ R− C−
µ
i.
Thus, we can compute the revenue rate and the social benefit rate according
to Theorem 2.3.1.
Finally, we give two computational examples. We assume a discrete
arrival rate in the first case, and an exponential arrival rate in the second
case. The parameters are shown in Table 2.2.
Two-category service
Constant cost
λ µ R C 
case 1 [0.1,5,10.6] w.p. [0.3,0.4,0.3] 1 100 10 1
case 2 exp( 1
0.5
) 1 100 10 1
Table 2.2: Constant Service Value, Uniform Waiting Cost Rate
The revenue rate functions are presented in figures 2.9 and 2.10. In the
discrete arrival rate case, indicated by figure 2.9, the revenue rate function has
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multiple modes in terms of p. In the exponential arrival rate case, the arrival
rate values are sampled from the given distribution. The revenue rate function
seems to have multiple modes (figure 2.10). The social benefit rate functions
are given in figures 2.11 and 2.12. The social benefit rate, when the arrival
rate is discrete, has multiple modes (figure 2.11).
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Figure 2.9: Constant Service Value, Uniform Waiting Cost Rate, case 1, Rev-
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Figure 2.11: Constant Service Value, Uniform Waiting Cost Rate, case 1,
Social Benefit Rate
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Chapter 3
State-dependent Pricing with Uncertain
Arrival Rate and Homogeneous Customers
In this chapter we study a model with similar settings in Chapter 2.
Some different assumptions include: the unknown arrival rate Λ is chosen by
nature from a given set [λ, λ¯], where 0 < λ ≤ λ¯; Customers have identical
values of service valuation R and waiting cost rate C; The admission fee may
change according to the queue length; Customers and the system manager
discount benefits and costs using a discount factor γ, with 0 < γ < 1.
3.1 Individual Customer Decision
Suppose the queue length is n, , n ≥ 0 and the admission fee is pn.
There is a new arrival and let τ be his waiting time in the system. Then τ has
a gamma distribution with shape parameter n+ 1 and scale parameter µ, and
Eτ (e
−γτ ) = φn+1, where φ = µ
µ+γ
. The customer enters the system if and only
if his expected net benefit is non-negative:
Eτ
[
e−γτR− pn − C
∫ τ
0
e−γtdt
]
= φn+1
(
R +
C
γ
)
−
(
pn +
C
γ
)
≥ 0.
For all n ≥ 0, the maximum admission fee inducing a new customer to
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enter the system is defined as p¯n, and
p¯n =
[
φn+1
(
R +
C
γ
)
− C
γ
]+
=
φ
n+1
(
R + C
γ
)
− C
γ
φn+1
(
R + C
γ
)
− C
γ
≥ 0
0 φn+1
(
R + C
γ
)
− C
γ
≤ 0.
(3.1)
For all pn ≥ 0, define
nˆ(pn) =
⌊
log
(
pn + C/γ
R + C/γ
)
/ log φ
⌋
. (3.2)
A new customer enters the system if the current queue length n ≤ nˆ(pn)− 1,
and balks if n ≥ nˆ(pn).
The maximum possible queue length is
n¯ =
⌊
log
(
C/γ
R + C/γ
)
/ log φ
⌋
. (3.3)
3.2 Transition Probabilities
The original problem of the SO or the RM can be modeled as a DTMDP,
in which the system state is the queue length. We utilize uniformization and
model the system as an infinite-horizon DTMDP. The state space is discrete
and finite, denoted by S = {0, 1, · · · , n¯}, where n¯ is defined in (3.3). The
transition rates are
vn =

Λ n = 0
Λ + µ 1 ≤ n ≤ nˆ(pn)− 1
µ n ≥ nˆ(pn).
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The transition probabilities are
qn,n−1 =
µ
Λ + µ
n ≥ 1
qn,n+1 =
{
Λ
Λ+µ
1 ≤ n ≤ nˆ(pn)− 1
1 n = 0
qnn = 0.
Let v = λ¯+ µ. We convert the CTMDP into an infinite horizon DTMDP.
The new discount factor is
α =
v
γ + v
.
The new transition probabilities are
qn,n−1 =
µ
v
n ≥ 1
qn,n+1 =
{
Λ
v
0 ≤ n ≤ nˆ(pn)− 1
0 n ≥ nˆ(pn)
qnn =

v−Λ
v
n = 0
v−Λ−µ
v
1 ≤ i ≤ nˆ(pn)− 1
v−µ
v
n ≥ nˆ(pn).
3.3 Robust Revenue Rate
In this section we study the RM’s problem with the objective of max-
imizing the total discounted revenue rate. By the assumption on the arrival
rate, nature chooses a value for Λ at time 0, and it remains fixed but not
observable to either customers or the RM. The original problem is a static
adversarial model. We first allow nature to independently draw a λ from the
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given set [λ, λ¯] at every decision point. We consider the max-min criterion in
order to find an optimal pricing policy.
First, we derive the Bellman equations for the RM’s problem. Let
V ∗(n) be the optimal revenue rate starting from queue length n, n ≥ 0. Then
V ∗(n) is the unique solution of the following robust Bellman equations:
V (0) =
1
γ + v
max
p0
min
Λ
{
vV (0) + Λ [p0 + V (1)− V (0)]
}
V (n) =
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
µ1{n≥1}V (n− 1)
+ (v − Λ− µ)1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}V (n) + (v − µ)1{n≥nˆ(pn)}V (n)
+ Λ1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)} [pn + V (n+ 1)]
}
n = 1, 2, . . . .
Then
V (0) =
v
γ + v
V (0) +
1
γ + v
max
p0
min
Λ
Λ [p+ V (1)− V (0)] .
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V (n) =
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
µ1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}V (n− 1) + µ1{n≥nˆ(pn)}V (n− 1)
+ (v − Λ− µ)1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}V (n) + (v − µ)1{n≥nˆ(pn)}V (n)
+ Λ1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)} [pn + V (n+ 1)]
}
=
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
[µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n)] 1{n≥nˆ(pn)}[
µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n) + Λ(pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n))]1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}}
=
1
γ + v
max
pn
{
[µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n)] 1{n≥nˆ(pn)}[
µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n) + min
Λ
Λ
(
pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)
)]
1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}
}
=
1
γ + v
{
[µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n)]
+ max
pn
min
Λ
Λ (pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)) 1{1≤n<nˆ(pn)}
}
=
1
γ + v
{
[µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n)]
+ max
pn
[
min
Λ
Λ [pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]
]+ }
n = 1, 2, . . . .
If pn is chosen so that an arriving customer is not willing to enter the system,
then n ≥ nˆ(pn) and V (n) does not depend on pn and Λ. If pn is chosen so that
an arriving customer is willing to enter the system, then n < nˆ(pn). Thus let
p∗n be the fee satisfying
nˆ(p∗n) = n+ 1.
According to (3.1),
p∗n = φ
n+1
(
R +
C
γ
)
− C
γ
. (3.4)
In order to maximize the revenue rate, the RM charges the largest pn such
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that n < nˆ(pn), which yields pn = p
∗
n. The robust Bellman equations are then
simplified as
V (0) =
1
γ + v
{
vV (0) + λ [p∗0 + V (1)− V (0)]+
}
V (n) =
1
γ + v
{
[µV (n− 1) + (v − µ)V (n)] + λ [p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]+
}
n = 1, 2, . . . .
Furthermore, we have
[p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]+ = max
{
p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n), 0
}
= − V (n) + max
{
p∗n + V (n+ 1), V (n)
}
.
The Bellman equations are then simplified as
V (0) =
µ+ λ¯− λ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗0 + V (1), V (0)
}
V (n) =
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯− λ
γ + v
V (n) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗n + V (n+ 1), V (n)
}
n = 1, 2, . . . . (3.5)
Recall that in Chen and Frank [5], the arrival rate is a known constant. In our
model if we let λ = λ¯, the Bellman equations in (3.5) reduce to the equations
in their model.
Next, we recall Lemma 1 in Chen and Frank [5], before we introduce
Proposition 3.3.2.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let p∗n be define in (3.4), let g(n) = max{p∗n+f(n+1), f(n)}.
If p∗n + f(n+ 1)− f(n) is non-increasing in n, so is p∗n + g(n+ 1)− g(n).
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Proof. The proof is in Chen and Frank [5].
Proposition 3.3.2. Let V (·) be the optimal value function satisfying (3.5).
Then
a) V (·) is non-increasing,
b) p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n) is non-increasing in n, where p∗n is defined by (3.4),
c) Suppose that p∗0 ≥ 0, then p∗0 + V (1)− V (0) ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this by induction. Let
Vm+1(0) =
µ+ λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vm(0) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗0 + Vm(1), Vm(0)
}
Vm+1(n) =
µ
γ + v
Vm(n− 1) + λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vm(n)
+
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗n + Vm(n+ 1), Vm(n)
}
.
then Vm → V (n) as m→∞.
Consider
∆1,m(n) = [p
∗
n + Vm(n+ 1)− Vm(n)]
− [p∗n+1 + Vm(n+ 2)− Vm(n+ 1)] ≥ 0, (3.6)
∆2,m(n) = Vm(n)− Vm(n+ 1) ≥ 0, (3.7)
∆3,m(0) = p
∗
0 + Vm(1)− Vm(0) ≥ 0. (3.8)
When m = 0, let V0(n) = 0 for all n ≥ 0, then (3.6)-(3.8) hold. Next suppose
(3.6)-(3.8) hold for m ≤ i, we want to show that these inequalities hold for
m = i+ 1.
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We first establish (3.6). Let
gm(n) = max
{
p∗n + Vm(n+ 1), Vm(n)
}
,
then
Vi+1(n+ 1)− Vi+1(n) = µ
γ + v
[Vi(n)− Vi(n− 1)] + λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]
+
λ
γ + v
[gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)] .
∆1,i+1(n)
= [p∗n + Vi+1(n+ 1)− Vi+1(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + Vi+1(n+ 2)− Vi+1(n+ 1)
]
= p∗n +
µ
γ + v
[Vi(n)− Vi(n− 1)] + λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]
+
λ
γ + v
[gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 +
µ
γ + v
[Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]
+
λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(n+ 2)− Vi(n+ 1)] + λ
γ + v
[gi(n+ 2)− gi(n+ 1)]
]
=
λ
γ + v
{
[p∗n + gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + gi(n+ 2)− gi(n+ 1)
] }
+
µ
γ + v
{ [
p∗n−1 + Vi(n)− Vi(n− 1)
]− [p∗n + Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]}
+
λ¯− λ
γ + v
{
[p∗n + Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + Vi(n+ 2)− Vi(n+ 1)
] }
+ p∗n − p∗n+1 −
λ
γ + v
(p∗n − p∗n+1)−
µ
γ + v
(p∗n−1 − p∗n)−
λ¯− λ
γ + v
(p∗n − p∗n+1)
=
λ
γ + v
{
[p∗n + gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + gi(n+ 2)− gi(n+ 1)
] }
+
µ
γ + v
∆1,i(n− 1) + λ¯− λ
γ + v
∆1,i(n)
+
γ + 2µ
γ + v
p∗n −
γ + µ
γ + v
p∗n+1 −
µ
γ + v
p∗n−1.
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Since
p∗n = φ
n+1
(
R− C
γ
)
− C
γ
φ =
µ
µ+ γ
.
Then
γ + 2µ
γ + v
p∗n −
γ + µ
γ + v
p∗n+1 −
µ
γ + v
p∗n−1
=
1
λ¯+ µ+ γ
[−µpn−1 + (γ + 2µ)pn − (γ + µ)pn+1]
=
1
λ¯+ µ+ γ
{
− µφn
(
R− C
γ
)
+ (2µ+ γ)φn+1
(
R− C
γ
)
− (µ+ γ)φn+2
(
R− C
γ
)
+
µC
γ
− (2µ+ γ)C
γ
+
(µ+ γ)C
γ
}
=
1
λ¯+ µ+ γ
{
φn
(
R− C
γ
)[
−µ+ (2µ+ γ) µ
µ+ γ
− µ
2
µ+ γ
]}
= 0.
∆1,i+1(n) =
λ
γ + v
{
[p∗n + gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + gi(n+ 2)− gi(n+ 1)
] }
+
µ
γ + v
∆1,i(n− 1) + λ¯− λ
γ + v
∆1,i(n).
According to Lemma 3.3.1, since (3.6) holds for m ≤ i, then
[p∗n + Vi(n+ 1)− Vi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + Vi(n+ 2)− Vi(n+ 1)
] ≥ 0
[p∗n + gi(n+ 1)− gi(n)]−
[
p∗n+1 + gi(n+ 2)− gi(n+ 1)
] ≥ 0.
Then
∆1,i+1(n) ≥ 0.
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We next show (3.7). According to (3.5),
∆2,i+1(n) = Vi+1(n)− Vi+1(n+ 1)
=
µ
γ + v
[Vi(n− 1)− Vi(n)] + λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(n)− Vi(n+ 1)]
+
λ
γ + v
[gi(n)− gi(n+ 1)]
=
µ
γ + v
∆2,i(n− 1) + λ¯− λ
γ + v
∆2,i(n) +
λ
γ + v
[gi(n)− gi(n+ 1)] .
Since we suppose (3.7) holds for m ≤ i, then
∆2,i(n− 1) ≥ 0, ∆2,i(n) ≥ 0.
According to Lemma 3.3.1,
gi(n)− gi(n+ 1) ≥ 0.
So
∆2,i+1(n) ≥ 0.
We now establish (3.8). Since
Vi+1(0) =
µ+ λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vi(0) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗0 + Vi(1), Vi(0)
}
Vi+1(1) =
µ
γ + v
Vi(0) +
λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vi(1) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗1 + Vi(2), Vi(1)
}
.
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Then
∆3,i+1(0) = p
∗
0 + Vi+1(1)− Vi+1(0)
= p∗0 +
µ
γ + v
Vi(0) +
λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vi(1) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗1 + Vi(2), Vi(1)
}
− µ+ λ¯− λ
γ + v
Vi(0) +
λ
γ + v
max
{
p∗0 + Vi(1), Vi(0)
}
= p∗0 −
λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(0)− Vi(1)]
+
λ
γ + v
{
max
{
p∗1 + Vi(2), Vi(1)
}
−max
{
p∗0 + Vi(1), Vi(0)
}}
.
Since we suppose (3.8) holds for m ≤ i, then
p∗0 + Vi(1)− Vi(0) ≥ 0.
Then
∆3,i+1(0) = p
∗
0 −
λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(0)− Vi(1)] + λ
γ + v
{
max
{
p∗1 + Vi(2), Vi(1)
}
− [p∗0 + Vi(1)]
}
= p∗0 +
λ¯− λ
γ + v
[Vi(1)− Vi(0)] + λ
γ + v
[p∗1 + Vi(2)− Vi(1)]+ −
λ
γ + v
p∗0
=
λ¯− λ
γ + v
[p∗0 + Vi(1)− Vi(0)] +
γ + µ
γ + v
p∗0 +
λ
γ + v
[p∗1 + Vi(2)− Vi(1)]+ .
Given p∗0 ≥ 0, ∆3,i+1(0) ≥ 0.
Next, we find the optimal policy for the RM based on Proposition 3.3.2.
Let
nR = sup{n : p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n) ≥ 0}.
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If p∗0 ≥ 0 then nR ≥ 0. Furthermore,
p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n) =
{
≥ 0 n ≤ nR
< 0 n > nR.
When n ≤ nR, the RM charges a fee of p∗n to encourage new customers
to enter the system. When n > nR, it is not optimal for the RM to charge the
fee p∗n since p
∗
n +V (n+ 1) < V (n), so the RM charges a fee that is larger than
p∗n, denoted by (p
∗
n)
+. According to the definition of p∗n in (3.4), an arriving
customer does not enter the system.
For the optimal policy of nature, when p∗n + V (n + 1) − V (n) ≥ 0, or
equivalently, n ≤ nR, nature chooses the value of λ. When p∗n + V (n + 1) −
V (n) < 0, nature chooses any value from the set [λ, λ¯]. Thus an optimal policy
for nature is to choose Λt = λ at each decision epoch.
Thus for the original static adversarial model in which nature chooses
a fixed arrival rate from the beginning of the system, an optimal policy for the
nature is to choose λ.
3.4 Robust Social Benefit Rate
In this section we consider the SO’s problem with the objective of max-
imizing the total discounted social benefit rate of the entire society. Assuming
a customer who does not enter receives zero benefit, suppose a new customer
arrives when the queue length is n. Then, the expected social benefit from the
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new customer is
e−γτR− C
∫ τ
u=0
e−γudu = e−γτR− C
γ
(
1− e−γτ)
= φn+1
(
R +
C
γ
)
− C
γ
= p∗n.
Thus the Bellman equations for the social optimization are the same as revenue
maximization. According to (3.5), the social-optimization problem and the
revenue-maximizing problem have the same optimal threshold. An arriving
customer enters the system when the queue length n ≤ nR, and balks when
n > nR.
3.5 Computational Study
In this section, we study how the lower and upper bounds of the random
arrival rate affect the optimal threshold and social benefit rate.
We give two computational examples. In the first case we change the
lower bound of the random arrival rate, while in the second case we change
the upper bound. The parameters are shown in Table 3.1.
Homogeneous Customers λ λ¯ µ R C γ
Case 1 [0.01,20] 20 1 100 10 0.095
Case 2 0.5 [0.5,10] 1 100 10 0.095
Table 3.1: Homogeneous Customers, Optimal Threshold
For the first case, figure 3.1 presents the change of optimal threshold
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to the lower bound value. Figure 3.2 shows the change of the optimal social
benefit rate to the lower bound value. We observe that the optimal threshold
is a non-increasing function of the lower bound, while the social benefit rate is
a non-decreasing function. For the second case, figure 3.3 presents the change
of the optimal threshold to the upper bound value, and as we expected, the
optimal threshold does not change with it. So in this model, only the lower
bound affects the optimal threshold and the social benefit rate.
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Figure 3.1: Homogeneous Customers, case 1, Optimal Threshold
56
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0
Lower Bound of 
0
200
400
600
800
So
cia
l =20
=1
R=100
C=10
=0.095
Social Benefit Rate S(p)
Figure 3.2: Homogeneous Customers, case 1, Social Benefit Rate
57
2 4 6 8 10
Upper Bound of 
3.80
3.85
3.90
3.95
4.00
4.05
4.10
4.15
4.20
Op
tim
al
 T
hr
es
ho
ld
=0.5
=1
R=100
C=10
=0.095
Optimal Threshold
Figure 3.3: Homogeneous Customers, case 2, Optimal Threshold
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Chapter 4
State-dependent Pricing with Uncertain
Arrival Rate and Heterogeneous Customers
In this chapter, we follow the same model assumptions in Chapter 3
except for the ones regarding customer characteristics. Instead of homogeneous
customers, we consider heterogeneous customers. The service value and the
waiting cost rate are assumed to be random variables and are denoted by X
and Y , respectively. We set E(X) = R, E(Y ) = C. The system manager does
not observe the values of individual customers, but only knows the joint cdf
of X and Y .
4.1 Individual Customer Decision
Suppose there is a new customer with service value x and waiting cost
rate y. He observes the queue length n and the admission price pn upon arrival.
Let τ denote his waiting time in the system. The customer enters the system
if and only if his net benefit is non-negative:
E
[
e−γτx− pn − y
∫ τ
0
e−γtdt
]
= φn+1
(
x+
y
γ
)
−
(
pn +
y
γ
)
≥ 0, where φ = µ
µ+ γ
.
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Given queue length n, the fraction of customer population who enter the sys-
tem is given by
PX,Y
(
φn+1X − 1− φ
n+1
γ
Y ≥ pn
)
.
Now define the random variables
Θn = φ
nX − 1− φ
n
γ
Y, ∀n ≥ 1,∀pn ≥ 0. (4.1)
Then F¯Θn+1(pn) is the joining fraction and
F¯Θn+1(pn) = PX,Y
(
φn+1X − 1− φ
n+1
γ
Y ≥ pn
)
. (4.2)
Lemma 4.1.1. F¯Θn+1(pn) is non-increasing in both n and pn.
Proof. First, it is trivial that ∀n ≥ 0, F¯Θn+1(pn) is non-increasing in pn. When
the value of admission fee is fixed, if let
~a =
(
φn
1−φn
γ
)
~Z =
(
X
Y
)
.
Then
Θn = ~a · ~Z.
Since ||~a|| is non-decreasing in p, F¯Θ
(
θˆ(p, n)
)
is non-increasing in both n and
p.
Given admission fee pn, according to (4.1), the transition probabilities
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are
qn,n−1 =
µ
v
n > 0
qn,n+1 =
{
Λ
v
Θn+1 > pn, n ≥ 0
0 Θn+1 ≤ pn, n ≥ 0
qnn =

v−Λ
v
Θn+1 > pn, n = 0
1 Θn+1 ≤ pn, n = 0
v−Λ−µ
v
Θn+1 > pn, n > 0
v−µ
v
Θn+1 ≤ pn, n > 0.
4.2 Robust Revenue Rate
In this section we derive the Bellman equations to solve for the optimal
pricing policy of the RM. Let V (n) be the expected revenue rate starting from
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queue length n, n ≥ 0. The robust Bellman equations are formulated as:
V (0) =
1
γ + v
max
p0
min
Λ
{
ΛF¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)] + (v − Λ)F¯Θ1(p0)V (0)
+ vFΘ1(p0)V (0)
}
=
1
γ + v
max
p0
min
Λ
{
vV (0) + ΛF¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)− V (0)]
}
=
v
γ + v
V (0) +
1
γ + v
max
p0
min
Λ
{
ΛF¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)− V (0)]
}
V (n) =
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
ΛF¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)] + µV (n− 1)
+ (v − µ)FΘn+1(pn)V (n) + (v − Λ− µ)F¯Θn+1(pn)V (n)
}
=
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
(v − µ)V (n) + µV (n− 1)
+ ΛF¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]
}
=
λ¯
γ + v
V (n) +
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1)
+
1
γ + v
max
pn
min
Λ
{
ΛF¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]
}
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.3)
These equations are then simplified as:
V (0) =
v
γ + v
V (0) +
λ
γ + v
max
p0
F¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)− V (0)]
V (n) =
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
V (n)
+
λ
γ + v
max
pn
F¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)− V (n)]
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.4)
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Furthermore,
V (0) =
µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
max
p0
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0)
]
V (0)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)]
}
V (n) =
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
max
pn
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
]
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)]
}
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.5)
Lemma 4.2.1. Let S = 0, 1, 2, . . ., V : S → R, u : S → R+. Consider the
following mappings:
(TV )(n) =

µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
max
p0
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0)
]
V (0)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)]
} n = 0
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
max
pn
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
]
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)]
} n = 1, 2, . . . .
(TµV )(n) =

µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
max
pu0
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p
u
0)
]
V (0)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p
u
0) [p
u
0 + V (1)]
} n = 0
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
max
pun
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(p
u
n)
]
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(p
u
n) [p
u
n + V (n+ 1)]
} n = 1, 2, . . . .
Then
1. If V (n) ≥ Vˆ (n), then (T kV )(n) ≥ (T kVˆ )(n), (T kuV )(n) ≥ (T ku Vˆ )(n) for
k = 1, 2, . . . .
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2. Let e : S → R s.t. e(x) = 1, ∀x ∈ S. Then (T k(V + r · e))(n) =
(T kV )(n) +αk · r, (T ku (V + r · e))(n) = (T kuV )(n) +αk · r, where α = vγ+v .
3. T is a contraction mapping.
Proof. Let
p∗n = argmax
pn
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
]
V (n) +
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)]
}
pˆ∗n = argmax
pn
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
]
Vˆ (n) +
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
[
pn + Vˆ (n+ 1)
]}
n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
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TV (n) =

µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
max
p0
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0)
]
V (0)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θ1(p0) [p0 + V (1)]
}
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
max
pn
{[
1− λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn)
]
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(pn) [pn + V (n+ 1)]
}
=

v
γ+v
maxp0
{
λF¯Θ1 (p0)
v
[p0 + V (1)] +
v−λF¯Θ1 (p0)
v
V (0)
}
v
γ + v
max
pn
{λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
[pn + V (n+ 1)] +
µ
v
V (n− 1)
+
v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
V (n)
}
=

v
γ+v
{
λF¯Θ1 (p∗0)
v
[p∗0 + V (1)] +
v−λF¯Θ1 (p∗0)
v
V (0)
}
v
γ + v
{λF¯Θn+1(p∗n)
v
[p∗n + V (n+ 1)] +
µ
v
V (n− 1)
+
v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(p∗n)
v
V (n)
}
≥

v
γ+v
{
λF¯Θ1 (pˆ∗0)
v
[pˆ∗0 + V (1)] +
v−λF¯Θ1 (pˆ∗0)
v
V (0)
}
v
γ + v
{λF¯Θn+1(pˆ∗n)
v
[pˆ∗n + V (n+ 1)] +
µ
v
V (n− 1)
+
v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(pˆ∗n)
v
V (n)
}
≥

v
γ+v
{
λF¯Θ1 (pˆ∗0)
v
[
pˆ∗0 + Vˆ (1)
]
+
v−λF¯Θ1 (pˆ∗0)
v
Vˆ (0)
}
n = 0
v
γ + v
{λF¯Θn+1(pˆ∗n)
v
[
pˆ∗n + Vˆ (n+ 1)
]
+
µ
v
Vˆ (n− 1)
+
v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(pˆ∗n)
v
Vˆ (n)
} n = 1, 2, . . . .
= T Vˆ (n).
Then (T kV )(n) ≥ (T kVˆ )(n) and (T kuV )(n) ≥ (T ku Vˆ )(n) for k = 1, 2, . . . .
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T (V + r · e)(n) =

v
γ + v
max
p0
{λF¯Θ1(p0)
v
[p0 + (V + r · e)(1)]
+
v − λF¯Θ1(p0)
v
(V + r · e)(0)
}
v
γ + v
max
pn
{λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
[pn + (V + r · e)(n+ 1)]
+
µ
v
(V + r · e)(n− 1)
+
v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
(V + r · e)(n)
}
=

v
γ + v
max
p0
{λF¯Θ1(p0)
v
[p0 + V (1)]
+
v − λF¯Θ1(p0)
v
V (0)
}
+
v
γ + v
r
n = 0
v
γ + v
max
pn
{λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
[pn + V (n+ 1)]
+
µ
v
V (n− 1) + v − µ− λF¯Θn+1(pn)
v
V (n)
}
+
v
γ + v
r
n = 1, 2, . . .
= (TV )(n) +
v
γ + v
r.
Then (T k(V +r·e))(n) = (T kV )(n)+αk ·r, (T ku (V +r·e))(n) = (T kuV )(n)+αk ·r,
where α = v
γ+v
.
Theorem 4.2.2. The Bellman equations derived in (4.4) have a unique fixed
point, which is the optimal revenue rate V ∗.
Proof. The proof is similar to the standard proof based on the Banach fixed
point theorem.
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4.3 Robust Social Benefit Rate
In this section we examine the total discounted social benefit rate. Sup-
pose a new customer arrives when the queue length is n. Let rn denote the
expected social benefit from this customer, then
rn = E
[
e−γτX − Y
∫ τ
0
e−γtdt
]
= φn+1
(
R +
C
γ
)
− C
γ
n = 0, 1, . . . .
Let W ∗(n) be the optimal robust social benefit rate starting at queue length
n, n ≥ 0. W ∗(n) is the unique solution of the following Bellman equations:
W (0) =
v
γ + v
W (0) +
λ
γ + v
max
p0
F¯Θ1(p0) [r0 +W (1)−W (0)]
W (n) =
µ
γ + v
W (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
W (n)
+
λ
γ + v
max
pn
F¯Θn+1(pn) [rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n)]
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.6)
Since rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n) does not depend on pn, then
p∗n =
{
argmaxpn F¯Θn+1(pn), rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n) ≥ 0
argminpn F¯Θn+1(pn), rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n) ≤ 0
=
{
0, rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n) ≥ 0
∞, rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n) ≤ 0.
n = 0, 1, . . . .
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The Bellman equations for the social benefit rate are derived as:
W (0) =
v
γ + v
W (0) +
λ
γ + v
F¯Θ1(0) [r0 +W (1)−W (0)]+
W (n) =
µ
γ + v
W (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
W (n)
+
λ
γ + v
F¯Θn+1(0) [rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n)]+
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.7)
Furthermore, we have
[rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n)]+ = max
{
rn +W (n+ 1)−W (n), 0
}
= max
{
rn +W (n+ 1),W (n)
}
−W (n).
Then
W (0) =
µ+ λ¯− λF¯Θ1(0)
γ + v
W (0) +
λ
γ + v
F¯Θ1(0) max
{
r0 +W (1),W (0)
}
W (n) =
µ
γ + v
W (n− 1) + λ¯− λF¯Θn+1(0)
γ + v
W (n)
+
λ
γ + v
F¯Θn+1(0) max
{
rn +W (n+ 1),W (n)
}
n = 1, 2, . . . . (4.8)
The Bellman equations for the social benefit rate are similar to the
equations we derived in Chapter 3, except that there is a joining fraction at
zero fee multiplied by the lower bound of the random arrival rate. So the
optimal policy for the SO is of the threshold type. And nature chooses λ at
all times.
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4.4 Computational Study
In this section we solve for the optimal pricing policies for the RM and
the SO, based on the Bellman equations in (4.5) and (4.8). We utilize the value
iteration algorithm with error bounds [3] to find the optimal pricing policy.
We first define two functions of p.
qn(p) =
λ
λ¯
F¯Θn+1(p) (4.9)
gn(p) = (1− qn(p))V (n) + qn(p) [p+ V (n+ 1)] . (4.10)
We use the same mapping defined in Lemma 4.2.1. We now introduce
the value iteration algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 Value Iteration
Input
State space S = {0, 1, . . . }
Action space A = R+
Reward function r : S × A→ R
Transition probabilities qij(a) = P (j|i, a)
Discounting factor α ∈ (0, 1)
Tolerance tol > 0
Output
Optimal admission fee p∗i , i ∈ S
Optimal value function J∗(i), i ∈ S
procedure
Initialize J0(S) arbitrarily
k ← 0
repeat
k ← k + 1
for each state i ∈ S do
Jk(i)← TJk(i)
end for
ck =
α
1−α mini∈S [Jk(i)− Jk−1(i)]
c¯k =
α
1−α maxi∈S [Jk(i)− Jk−1(i)]
until c¯k − ck < t
for each state i ∈ S do
p∗i ← argmaxpi gki (pi)
J∗(i)← Jk(i) + ck+c¯k2 ~e
end for
return
end procedure
Next, we give some computational examples using this algorithm.
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4.4.1 Exponential Service Uniform Cost
Assume the service value X and the waiting cost rate Y are inde-
pendent. In this section we discuss a case when X ∼ exp( 1
R
) and Y ∼
U [C − , C + ], where  ≤ C. R, C and  are positive constants.
Theorem 4.4.1. Given X and Y are independent random variables. And
X ∼ exp( 1
R
) and Y ∼ U [C − , C + ], where  ≤ C. R, C and  are positive
constants. As defined in (4.10), the function gn(p) is a unimodal function in
terms of p.
Proof. The joint pdf of X and Y is
fX,Y (x, y) = fX(x)fY (y) =
{
1
2R
e−
1
R
x x ≥ 0
0 x < 0.
The joining fraction of the customer population is
F¯Θn(p) = Pr
X,Y
(
φnX − 1− φ
n
γ
Y ≥ p
)
=
∫∫
φnx− 1−φn
γ
y≥p
C−≤y≤C+
fX,Y (x, y)dxdy
=
1
2
∫ C+
C−
∫ ∞
1−φn
γφn
y+ p
φn
1
R
e−
1
R
xdxdy
=
1
2
∫ C+
C−
exp
(
− 1
R
(
1− φn
γφn
y +
p
φn
))
dy
=
1
2
e−
p
Rφn
∫ C+
C−
e−
1−φn
γRφn
ydy
=
γRφn
2 (1− φn)e
− p
Rφn
(
e−
1−φn
γRφn
(C−) − e− 1−φ
n
γRφn
(C+)
)
. (4.11)
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According to (4.11), let
F¯Θn(p) = ane
−bnp.
Then
an+1 =
γRφn+1
2 (1− φn+1)
(
e
− 1−φn+1
γRφn+1
(C−) − e− 1−φ
n+1
γRφn+1
(C+)
)
bn+1 =
1
Rφn+1
.
Using (4.9) we have,
qn(p) =
λ
λ¯
an+1e
−bn+1p
∂qn(p)
∂p
= − λ
λ¯
an+1bn+1e
−bn+1p.
With (4.10) we obtain
∂gn(p)
∂p
=
∂qn(p)
∂p
[p+ V (n+ 1)− V (n)] + qn(p)
= − λ
λ¯
an+1bn+1e
−bn+1p [p+ V (n+ 1)− V (n)] + λ
λ¯
an+1e
−bn+1p
=
λ
λ¯
an+1e
−bn+1p{1− bn+1 [p+ V (n+ 1)− V (n)]}.
If there exists an admission fee p∗ satisfying ∂gn(p
∗)
∂p
= 0, then
p∗n =
1
bn+1
+ V (n)− V (n+ 1)
= Rφn+1 + V (n)− V (n+ 1).
Furthermore, we have
∂gn(p)
∂p
≥ 0, p ≤ p∗
∂gn(p)
∂p
≤ 0, p ≥ p∗.
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Theorem 4.4.2. Suppose X and Y are independent random variables. And
X ∼ exp( 1
R
) and Y ∼ U [C−, C+], where  ≤ C. Let R, C and  be positive
constants. Then the optimal pricing policy at queue length n is
p∗n = Rφ
n+1 + V (n)− V (n+ 1).
Furthermore, the Bellman equations are
V (0) =
µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
[
V (0) +
λ
λ¯
RφF¯Θ1 (Rφ+ V (0)− V (1))
]
V (n) =
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
[
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
Rφn+1F¯Θn+1
(
Rφn+1 + V (n)− V (n+ 1))]
n = 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. The derivation is as follows:
qn(p
∗
n) =
λ
λ¯
an+1e
bn+1(V (n+1)−V (n))−1
gn(p
∗
n) = [1− qn(p∗n)] + qn(p∗n) [p∗n + V (n+ 1)]
= V (n) + [p∗n + V (n+ 1)− V (n)] qn(p∗n)
= V (n) +Rφn+1qn(p
∗
n)
= V (n) +
λ
λ¯
Rφn+1F¯Θn(Rφ
n+1 + V (n)− V (n+ 1))
V (0) =
µ
γ + v
V (0) +
λ¯
γ + v
[
V (0) +
λ
λ¯
RφF¯Θ1 (Rφ+ V (0)− V (1))
]
V (n) =
µ
γ + v
V (n− 1) + λ¯
γ + v
[
V (n)
+
λ
λ¯
Rφn+1F¯Θn+1
(
Rφn+1 + V (n)− V (n+ 1))]
n = 1, 2, . . . .
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Next we give four computational examples using the algorithm in Sec-
tion 4.4. We study the sensitivity of the optimal revenue rate and the optimal
pricing policy to various parameters. We consider four cases: various service
value expectation in case 1; various waiting cost rate expectation in case 2;
various uniform cost parameter in case 3; and various discount factor in case
4. The parameters are shown in Table 4.1.
Expo service
Uniform cost
λ λ¯ µ γ R C 
Case 1 0.5 1 2 0.9 (10,1010,10) 4 0.5
Case 2 1 1 2 0.9 50 (1,1011,10) 0.5
Case 3 1 1 2 0.9 100 1000 (1,1000,5)
Case 4 1 1 2 (0.5,1,0.05) 15 20 0.5
Table 4.1: Exponential Service Value Uniform Waiting Cost Rate
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 correspond to case 1. Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7
and 4.8 correspond to case 2. Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 correspond to
case 3. Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 correspond to case 4.
The service values are sampled from the given distributions. We observe
that the optimal revenue rate function V ∗(n) appears to be non-increasing in
n, based on figures 4.1, 4.5, 4.9 and 4.13.
Similarly, the optimal pricing policy appears to be non-increasing in
the queue length n, based on figures 4.2, 4.6, 4.10 and 4.14.
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When the waiting cost rate is fixed, p∗n and V
∗(n) are non-decreasing
in the service value expectation R (figures 4.1, 4.2). When R is fixed, p∗n and
V ∗(n) are non-increasing in the waiting cost rate expectation C (figures 4.5,
4.6), and non-decreasing in the uniform distribution parameter  (figures 4.9,
4.10). When both R and C are fixed, p∗n and V
∗(n) are non-increasing in the
discount factor γ (figures 4.13, 4.14).
We consider the following two performance measures of the algorithm:
the number of algorithm iterations and the CPU running time. We observe
that these two are both non-decreasing in R (figures 4.3, 4.4) and  (figures
4.11, 4.12), and non-increasing in C (figures 4.7, 4.8) and γ (figures 4.15, 4.16).
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Figure 4.1: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1, Var-
ious Expected Service Value, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.2: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1, Var-
ious Expected Service Value, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.3: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1, Var-
ious Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.4: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1, Var-
ious Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Figure 4.5: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2, Var-
ious Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.6: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2, Var-
ious Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.7: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2, Var-
ious Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.8: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2, Var-
ious Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Execution Time
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Figure 4.9: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3, Var-
ious Uniform Parameter, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.10: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.11: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.12: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Execution Time
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Figure 4.13: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.14: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.15: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.16: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Execution Time
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4.4.2 Pareto Service Uniform Cost
Assume the service value X and the waiting cost rate Y are indepen-
dent. In this section we discuss a case when X has a Pareto distribution with
parameter α, and Y ∼ U [C−, C+], where α, C and  are positive constants.
Then α = R
R−1 , given R > 1.
We first derive he joint pdf of X and Y :
fX,Y (x, y) = fX(x)fY (y) =
{
α
2xα+1
x ≥ 1
0 x < 1.
The joining fraction of the customer population is
F¯Θn(p) = Pr
X,Y
(
φnX − 1− φ
n
γ
Y ≥ p
)
=
∫∫
φnx− 1−φn
γ
y≥p
C−≤y≤C+
x>≥1
fX,Y (x, y)dxdy.
If
φn >
C + + γp
C + + γ
,
then
F¯Θn(p) =
1
2
∫ C+
C−
∫ ∞
1
α
xα+1
dxdy = 1.
If
φn <
C − + γp
C − + γ ,
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then
F¯Θn(p) =
1
2
∫ C+
C−
∫ ∞
1−φn
γφn
y+ p
φn
α
xα+1
dxdy
=
(γφn)α
2(1− α) (1− φn)
[
[(1− φn)(C + ) + γp]1−α
− [(1− φn)(C − ) + γp]1−α
]
.
If
C − + γp
C − + γ ≤ φ
n ≤ C + + γp
C + + γ
,
then
F¯Θn(p) =
1
2
∫ γ(φn−p)
1−φn
C−
∫ ∞
1
α
xα+1
dxdy
1
2
∫ C+
γ(φn−p)
1−φn
∫ ∞
1−φn
γφn
y+ p
φn
α
xα+1
dxdy
=
1
2
[
γ(φn − p)
1− φn − (C − )
]
+
(γφn)α
2(1− α) (1− φn)
[
[(1− φn)(C + ) + γp]1−α
− [γ(φn − p) + γp]1−α
]
.
Next we give four computational examples. Similar to section 4.4.1, We
study the sensitivity of the optimal revenue rate and the optimal pricing policy
to four parameters: service value expectation, waiting cost rate expectation,
uniform cost parameter and discount factor. The parameters are shown in
Table 4.2.
Figures 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 correspond to case 1. Figures 4.21,
4.22, 4.23 and 4.24 correspond to case 2. Figures 4.25, 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28
correspond to case 3. Figures 4.29, 4.30, 4.31 and 4.32 correspond to case 4.
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Pareto service
Uniform cost
λ λ¯ µ γ R C 
Case 1 0.5 1 2 0.9 (2,22,1) 4 0.5
Case 2 0.5 1 2 0.9 3 (1,15,0.5) 0.5
Case 3 0.5 1 2 0.9 2.5 10 (0.5,10,0.5)
Case 4 0.5 1 2 (0.5,1,0.05) 5 10 0.5
Table 4.2: Pareto Service Value Uniform Waiting Cost Rate
The service values are sampled from the given distributions. We observe
that the optimal revenue rate function V ∗(n) appears to be non-increasing in
n, based on figures 4.17, 4.21, 4.25 and 4.29.
However, we observe that the optimal pricing policy p∗n appears to be
non-decreasing in the queue length n, based on figures 4.18, 4.22, 4.26 and
4.30. This observation is different than that in section 4.4.1.
When the waiting cost rate is fixed, p∗n and V
∗(n) are non-decreasing
in the service value expectation R (figures 4.17, 4.18). When R is fixed, p∗n is
non-increasing in the waiting cost rate expectation C (figure 4.22), but V ∗(n)
seems to be non-increasing in C when the queue length is below certain value
(figure 4.21).
When R and C are fixed, p∗n and V
∗(n) are non-decreasing in the uni-
form distribution parameter  (figures 4.25, 4.26). And p∗n and V
∗(n) are
non-increasing in the discount factor γ (figures 4.29, 4.30).
In terms of the number of algorithm iterations and the CPU running
time. We observe that these two are both non-decreasing in R (figures 4.19,
94
4.20). The affect of  is not obvious from figures 4.27, 4.28. This is different
than the observation about  in section 4.4.1. The iteration numbers and CPU
running time are non-increasing in C (figures 4.23, 4.24) and γ (figures 4.31,
4.32).
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Figure 4.17: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1,
Various Expected Service Value, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.18: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1,
Various Expected Service Value, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.19: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1,
Various Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.20: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 1,
Various Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Figure 4.21: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2,
Various Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.22: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2,
Various Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.23: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2,
Various Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.24: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 2,
Various Expected Waiting Cost Rate, Execution Time
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Figure 4.25: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.26: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.27: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.28: Expo service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 3,
Various Uniform Parameter, Execution Time
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Figure 4.29: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Revenue Rate
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Figure 4.30: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.31: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.32: Pareto service Uniform cost, Revenue Rate Optimality, case 4,
Various Discount Factor, Execution Time
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Next we investigate the sensitivity of the optimal social benefit rate
and the optimal threshold to various parameters. We use the same parameter
settings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
According to figures 4.33, 4.37, 4.41, 4.45, the optimal social benefit
rate function S∗(n) is non-increasing in n.
According to figures 4.34, 4.38, 4.42, 4.46, the optimal queue length
threshold n∗ is non-decreasing in the expected service valueR and non-increasing
in the expected waiting cost rate C.
When the waiting cost rate C is fixed, S∗(n) are non-decreasing in the
expected service value R (figures 4.33, 4.41). When the expected service value
R is fixed, S∗(n) is non-increasing in the expected waiting cost rate C (figures
4.37), but in the Pareto distribution case, S∗(n) seems to be non-increasing in
C when the queue length is below certain value (figure 4.45).
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Figure 4.33: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 4.34: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Optimal Threshold
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Figure 4.35: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.36: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Figure 4.37: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 4.38: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.39: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.40: Expo service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Figure 4.41: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 4.42: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Optimal Threshold
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Figure 4.43: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.44: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
1, Various Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Figure 4.45: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Social Benefit Rate
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Figure 4.46: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Optimal Fee
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Figure 4.47: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Algorithm Iterations
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Figure 4.48: Pareto service Uniform cost, Social Benefit Rate Optimality, case
2, Various Expected Service Value, Execution Time
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this chapter we give a summary of the main results in this research.
We also discuss the main contributions of our work.
5.1 Summary
In this research, we extend Naor’s observable queueing model into three
main models by considering: uncertain arrival rate, heterogeneous customers,
static and state-dependent pricing policies.
In Chapter 2, we construct a model in which the arrival rate is uncer-
tain and customers have different economic characteristics. We assume the
arrival rate is a proper non-negative random variable whose value is not ob-
served by either customers or the system manager. But the system manager
has the information of the arrival rate distribution. We model the customer
heterogeneity via a general joint distribution and prove that such a system is
stable with probability 1 in Theorem 2.2.4. We derive the revenue rate and the
social benefit rate in Theorem 2.3.1. We give a limiting property of the rev-
enue rate, as the admission fee goes infinity, in Theorem 2.3.2. The property
is important to other results on the revenue rate, especially when we consider
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“unimodality”, which holds in the Naor’s basic model. The social benefit rate
in general has a complicated formula, as indicated in Theorem 2.3.1. However,
it can be simplified when customers have exponentially distributed service val-
ues and identical waiting cost rates. We show that p∗S ≤ p∗Z , as long as S(p)
and Z(p) are unimodal and continuously differetiable in Theorem 2.4.2. Fi-
nally, we examine two special examples in which either the service value is
discrete, or the waiting cost rate is uniformly distributed. We show computa-
tional results which indicate the revenue rate and the social benefit rate have
multiple modes in terms of the admission fee.
In Chapter 3, we consider a model in which the arrival rate is uncertain
and customers have identical economic characteristics, but the admission fee
is allow to change as the queue length changes. We assume natures chooses
the arrival rate value from a given set. The original problem of the SO or
RM can be modeled by a CTMDP, in which the queue length is the system
state. The state space is discrete and finite. The action space is continuous
and closed. We construct a dynamic adversarial model, in which nature may
choose different values for the arrival rate as the queue length changes. We
convert the CTMDP into a DTMDP and establish Bellman’s equations for
the RM’s problem based on a max-min criterion. We give the properties of
the optimal value function of the Bellman equations in Proposition 3.3.2. It
is important that when the customers are homogeneous, there is a maximal
fee that attracts new customers to enter the system at each queue length.
We show that in the RM’s problem, customers follow an optimal threshold
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policy. The optimal policy for nature is to choose the lower bound of the
random arrival rate. We prove that the SO and the RM have the same optimal
threshold, which is similar to the results in Chen and Frank [5]. Finally, we
provide computational examples in which we study how the optimal threshold
is affected by the lower and upper bounds of the random arrival rate.
In Chapter 4, we extend the model of Chapter 3 by allowing the cus-
tomer characteristics to be random. As in Chapter 3, we model the RM’s prob-
lem by a DTMDP and derive Bellman’s equations. We prove that the mapping
defined in the Bellman equations is a contraction mapping in Lemma 4.2.1.
However, when the customers are heterogeneous, the optimal pricing policy
is in general not an explicit function of the queue length. In Section 4.4, we
construct an algorithm to solve for the optimal pricing policy. We assume the
service value and the waiting cost rate are independent and consider two types
of distribution of the random service value. The waiting cost rate is modeled
as a uniformly distributed random variable. In theorem 4.4.2 we show that the
algorithm can be simplified and the optimal pricing policy is obtained as an
explicit function of the queue length. We give computational results to assess
the sensitivity of the optimal policy to various parameters. Especially, we find
that when the service value follows a Pareto distribution, the optimal policy
is a non-decreasing function of the queue length. For the SO’s problem, the
Bellman equations imply that the optimal policy is a threshold policy. This is
because the SO cannot observe individual values, so the customers are either
all admitted into the system or all rejected.
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5.2 Contributions
In most existing models, the system manager (SO or RM) has complete
information of the arrival rate. The optimal pricing policy also depends on
the value of the arrival rate. However, we are motivated by the fact that in
reality the arrival rate often needs to be estimated. Furthermore, because of
the uncertainty of the arrival rate, the stability of the system is of interest.
We find limited research on this topic. In Chapter 2, we discuss the conditions
of system stability and prove that the system is stable almost surely under
mild conditions. This conclusion is important for further study of the system
optimality. It also can be extended to other models with various settings.
In this chapter, we also observe some examples of interest. In those cases,
the revenue rate and the social benefit rate are not unimodal functions of the
admission fee. We have seen an example given by Edelson and Hilderbrand [7],
in which the waiting cost rate is a two-category variable. However, in the case
when customers have exponentially distributed service values and degenerate
waiting cost rates, the revenue rate and the social benefit rate seem to be
unimodal from the computational results. Unfortunately the proof is not easy,
so we assume unimodality and show that p∗S ≤ p∗Z in Theorem 2.4.2.
Chen and Frank [5] investigate a state-dependent model with homoge-
neous customers. We extend their model in Chapters 3 and 4. We introduce
a robust MDP framework and study a dynamic adversarial problem in which
we allow nature to choose different values for the arrival rate as the queue
length changes. The problem is formulated in a game-theoretic manner. In
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Chapter 3, we use a max-min criterion and conclude that the RM and the
SO have the same optimal threshold, and nature chooses the lower bound of
the random arrival rate. Future work could involve examining similar systems
with different optimality criteria.
In Chapter 4 we investigate a more complicated model than the model
of Chapter 3, by considering heterogeneous customers. We first formulate the
robust Bellman equations for the RM’s problem. We prove that the Bellman
equations characterize the optimal value function. This is fundamental to the
algorithm we later introduce in this chapter. In order to solve for the optimal
pricing policy, we use value iteration algorithm with error bounds [3]. In gen-
eral a numerical search algorithm is used for solving the maximization problem
defined in the Bellman equations. We derive the optimal pricing policy based
on unimodality property in a case when customers have exponential service
values and uniform waiting cost rates. The optimal fee is an explicit function
of the queue length. In addition, we investigate the impact of heavy-tailed dis-
tribution of customer heterogeneity. We give an example in which the service
value follows a Pareto distribution and the waiting cost rate follows a uniform
distribution. The optimal pricing policy seems to be a non-decreasing func-
tion of the queue length from the numerical results. This also indicates more
future work on the topic of heavy-tailed distributions, which is an interesting
extension of this research. Last, we prove that the optimal pricing policy for
the SO is of the threshold type, which is similar to Chen and Frank’s results
[5]. They prove that there is no different in terms of the optimal threshold
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when customers are homogeneous or heterogeneous. However, in our model,
the optimal threshold is different than the case of homogeneous customers.
5.3 Future Work
Our work is based on Naor’s M/M/1 observable model. There are
several possible extensions for future work. One of the assumptions in our
models is that customers are not allowed to renege. However, when customers
are heterogeneous and may renege, the problem could be challenging but more
applicable to real life scenarios. Another interesting extension is to consider
a multi-server model with arrival rate uncertainty. In such case each server
could have different belief on the arrival rate since customers could choose from
different queues. If each queue applies state-dependent pricing, the optimal
behavior of customers is affected by multiple queue lengths and fees. Last
but not least, we believe investigating a heavy-tailed customer heterogeneity
is also of interest, since the optimal policy relies much on the randomness of
customer characteristics.
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Appendix 1
Appendix for Static Pricing with Uncertain
Arrival Rate and Heterogeneous Customers
We use a modification of the lemma below to prove Theorem 2.4.2. We
provide a more general statement here, as it may of use in subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1.0.1. For an MΛ/M/1 system with heterogeneous customers we
have:
1. pi0(p) is a non-decreasing function of p.
2. limp→∞ pi0(p) = 1.
Proof. First, by (2.6), we have that for all p ≥ 0
pi0(p) = EΛ
(
1
M
)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1 +
∑∞
n=1
∏n
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)fΛ(λ)dλ. (1.1)
We note that pi0(p) is positive for all p ≥ 0 and almost all realizations of Λ by
Theorem 2.2.4. Since F¯Θi(p) is a ccdf, it is non-increasing for all i. Then, it is
clear from (1.1) that pi0 is non-decreasing in p.
Next, we prove the limit result. By Lemma 2.2.3, ∀λ ≥ 0 and all finite
n positive integers n
lim
p→∞
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
= 0.
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We again recall that F¯Θi(p) is non-increasing in p and thus
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
≤
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(0)
)
for all p ≥ 0, all λ ≥ 0 and positive n. Now, using the stability result (Theorem
2.2.4), we have
∑∞
n=1
∏n
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(0)
)
<∞. Hence, for each p ≥ 0
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
is dominated by a summable function. Applying dominated convergence, we
obtain
lim
p→∞
∞∑
n=1
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
=
∞∑
n=1
lim
p→∞
n∏
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)
= 0.
Next, since F¯Θi(p) is always non-negative we have
0 ≤ 1
1 +
∑∞
n=1
∏n
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
) ≤ 1.
Hence this expression is uniformly dominated by 1, which is integrable against
fΛ(λ). Now, returning to (1.1), again applying dominated convergence and
basic properties of limits, we finally conclude that
lim
p→∞
pi0(p) =
∫ ∞
0
lim
p→∞
1
1 +
∑∞
n=1
∏n
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)fΛ(λ)dλ
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + limp→∞
∑∞
n=1
∏n
i=1
(
λ
µ
F¯Θi(p)
)fΛ(λ)dλ = 1
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. First we note
Z = µp (1− pi0(p)) = µ
∫ ∞
0
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
p
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
1 +
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
fΛ(λ)dλ.
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If E[Θ2n] <∞ ∀n ≥ 1, then
lim
p→∞
pF¯Θn(p) = 0,
by observing that the bound on the second moment implies∫ ∞
0
pF¯Θn(p) <∞.
Further, we have ∀n ≥ 1, limp→∞ F¯Θi(p) = 0. Hence, ∀n ≥ 1,
lim
p→∞
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) = 0.
Thus for all λ ≥ 0 and µ > 0,
lim
p→∞
λn
µn
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) = 0.
Next, since limp→∞ pF¯Θ1(p) = 0, the function has a finite maximum on [0,∞).
In other words, for some finite K, pF¯Θ1(p) ≤ K, for all p ≥ 0. Then we have
that
λn
µn
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) ≤
λn
µn
K,
for all p ≥ 0. Further, the dominating function on the right-hand side is
summable, as
∞∑
n=1
λn
µn
K =
Kρ
1− ρ <∞,
where we set ρ = λ/µ. Notice that ρ < 1 for all λ, by our assumption in the
theorem statement. Then, applying dominated convergence we have
lim
p→∞
∞∑
n=1
λn
µn
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) =
∞∑
n=1
lim
p→∞
λn
µn
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) = 0,
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This further implies that
lim
p→∞
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
p
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
1 +
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
= 0.
Furthermore, since the denominator is always greater than or equal to 1, we
have ∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
p
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
1 +
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
≤
∞∑
n=1
λn
µn
p
n∏
i=1
F¯Θi(p) ≤
Kρ
1− ρ,
as argued above. The dominating function on the right-hand side is integrable
against fΛ(λ), by virtue of the bound in the theorem statement. Hence, with
yet another application of dominated convergence, we obtain the final result:
lim
p→∞
Z(p) = µ lim
p→∞
∫ ∞
0
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
p
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
1 +
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
fΛ(λ)dλ
= µ
∫ ∞
0
lim
p→∞
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
p
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
1 +
∑∞
n=1
λn
µn
∏n
i=1 F¯Θi(p)
fΛ(λ)dλ = 0.
139
Bibliography
[1] P. Afe`che and B. Ata. Bayesian dynamic pricing in queueing systems with
unknown delay cost characteristics. Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 15(2):292–304, 2013.
[2] J. A. Bagnell, A. Y. Ng, and J. Schneider. Solving uncertain markov de-
cision problems. Technical Report CMU-RI-TR-01-25, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA, August 2001.
[3] Dimitri P. Bertsekas. Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, vol-
ume 2. Athena Scientific, Belmont, Massachusetts, 3rd edition, 2007.
[4] O. Besbes and C. Maglaras. Revenue optimization for a make-to-order
queue in an uncertain market environment. Operations Research, 57(6):1438–
1450, 2009.
[5] H. Chen and M. Z. Frank. State dependent pricing with a queue. IIE
Transactions, 33(10):847–860, 2001.
[6] Ying Chen. Resource Allocation in Service and Logistics Systems. PhD
thesis, Graduate Program in Operations Research and Industrial Engi-
neering, University of Texas at Austin, 2016.
[7] N. M. Edelson and D. K. Hildebrand. Congestion tolls for Poisson queu-
ing processes. Econometrica, 43(1):81–92, 1975.
140
[8] R. Givan, S. Leach, and T. Dean. Bounded parameter markov decision
processes. Artificial Intelligence, 122(1-2):71–109, 2000.
[9] R. Hassin. Information and uncertainty in a queueing system. Probability
in the Engineering and Informational Sciences, 21(3):361–380, 2007.
[10] R. Hassin and R. Snitkovsky. Social and monopoly optimization in ob-
servable queues. 2019. Preprint.
[11] M. Haviv and B. S. Randhawa. Pricing in queues without demand infor-
mation. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 16(3):401–
411, 2014.
[12] G. N. Iyengar. Robust dynamic programming. Mathematics of Opera-
tions Research, 30(2):257–280, 2005.
[13] C. Larsen. Investigating sensitivity and the impact of information on
pricing decisions in anM/M/1/∞ queueing model. International Journal
of Production Economics, 56–57:365–377, 1998.
[14] S. A. Lippman and S. Stidham Jr. Individual versus social optimization
in exponential congestion systems. Operations Research, 25:233–247,
1977.
[15] P. Naor. The regulation of queue size by levying tolls. Econometrica,
37(1):15–24, 1969.
141
[16] A. Nilim and L. E. Ghaoui. Robust control of Markov decision processes
with uncertain transition matrices. Operations Research, 53(5):780–798,
2005.
[17] I. Para-Frutos and J. Aranda-Gallego. Multiproduct monopoly: a queue-
ing approach. Applied Economics, 31:565–576, 1999.
[18] M. L. Puterman. Markov Decision Processes. Wiley-Interscience, New
York, 1994.
[19] J. K. Satia and R. E. Lave. Markov decision processes with uncertain
transition probabilities. Operations Research, 21:728–740, 1973.
[20] J. R. Schroeter. The costs of concealing the customer queue. Bureau of
Business and Economic Research, Arizona State University, 1982. work-
ing paper EC-118.
[21] S. Wei and S. Li. Effect of information, uncertainty and parameter vari-
ability on profits in a queue with various pricing strategies. International
Journal of Systems Science, 45:1781–1789, 2014.
[22] C. C. White and H. K. Eldeib. Markov decision processes with imprecise
transition probabilities. Operations Research, 42:739–749, 1994.
142
Vita
Chengcheng Liu was born in Suihua, China. She joined the Operations
Research and Industrial Engineering program at The University of Texas at
Austin as a doctoral student in Fall 2013. Prior to that, She received a Master’s
degree in Statistics from Columbia University in the City of New York in
Spring 2013. She finished her Bachelor’s degree in Statistics from the Renmin
University of China, Beijing, China in 2011. She completed research with Dr.
John J. Hasenbein on Stability and Pricing in Naor’s Model with Arrival Rate
Uncertainty. She is currently working as a Data Scientist in IBM located in
Foster City, California.
Address: cl35622@utexas.edu
This dissertation was typeset with LATEX
† by the author.
†LATEX is a document preparation system developed by Leslie Lamport as a special
version of Donald Knuth’s TEX Program.
143
